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A COMMON LAWYER LooKS AT THE C1v1LLAw. By F. H. Lawson. Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Law School. 1955. Pp. xvii, 238. $4.
The Cold War has made it evident that the fate of any people depends
as much upon international as domestic factors. This means that any
lawyer who would be effective in governmental service, either as a legislator,
a civil servant or a Secretary of State, must know something about the
cultural and legal mentalities of other nations. In short, comparative
cultural philosophy and comparative law are becoming more and more
necessary in legal education.
This is already recognized in the case of Soviet law. The introduction
of Western political and legal forms into Asian and Islamic societies makes
comparative studies of the modern Western and the classical Asian and
Mohammedan cultural and legal mentalities equally important. Recent
misunderstandings between the British and Continental statesmen with
respect to political and legal collaboration in a European Union at Strasbourg and between American and French statesmen with respect to EDC
demonstrate an equal need for a comparative understanding of the identities and differences between Anglo-American common law and Continental
European civil law. The latter consideration gives practical as well as
theoretical significance to the recently published Fifth Series of Thomas M.
Cooley Lectures at the University of Michigan Law School. This series
is by the Professor of Comparative Law of Oxford University and bears
the title, A Common Lawyer Looks at the Civil Law.
Professor F. H. Lawson's comparative study has special significance for
judges and lawyers in the United States. The civil law, as Professor
Lawson shows, has unique formal scientific properties which derive from
Roman law. ·when one relates these formal properties, as described by
Professor Lawson, to Stoic Roman philosophy and to the Greek philosophy
and mathematical physics by way of Scaevola and the later Roman and
Byzantine jurists, it appears that the formal scientific properties which
distinguish Roman and civil law from the common law depend upon a
particular legal philosophy which affirms the thesis that moral and legal
man is universal man. The effect of this Greek and Stoic Roman natural
law philosophy upon Roman law was, through the idea of the jus gentium,
to break moral and legal man free from the various family-centered and
tribally-centered men of each particular jus civile, to identify the morally
and the legally good with any man whatever regardless of his family and
tribal status as determined by his color of skin. This legal philosophy,
given modern content by Newton and the early John Locke of the Lectures
on Natural Law, The Letter Concerning Toleration, and the treatise Of
Civil Government, went into the Declaration of Independence through
the mind and pen of Jefferson and into the Bill of Rights of the written
Constitution of the United States due to the initial insistence of Jefferson.
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It is from this natural law philosophy of Jefferson, the early John Locke
and the Stoic Romans that the legal tradition for the judicial review of
majority legislation in the light of the Bill of Rights derives. In fact it is
very difficult to see how the recent unanimous decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States with respect to segregation in education can be
justified except by appeal to this natural law theory.
The analytical proof of this conclusion is as follows: The thesis that
moral and legal man is universal man is the assertion that for anything
to be good or just it must hold for any person whatever. Expressed symbolically, this gives:
(p) : xis just= (p) x, where (p) x means that x holds for any person.
Substituting
States" for x
(p) : The
is just =

"The public educational system of any state in the United
in the foregoing expression gives: ·
public educational system of any state in the United States
This educational system must hold for any person.

It appears, therefore, that if contemporary judges and lawyers in the
United States are to understand their own legal system and justify some,
at least, of its contemporary Supreme Court decisions, they must understand Roman law as well as the common law. In fact, the early legal
system of the United States and at least part of its present constitutional
law have a content which is that of a theory of justice appearing first in
Stoic Roman law and a form which is that of the common law.
In what do the differences between the form of the common law and
that of the Civil law and Roman law consist? The major importance of
Professor Lawson's book is that it provides an answer to this question.
His first general specification of the difference between the common
law and the civil law is that the former is largely the creation of practical
lawyers and judges in their handling and settling of disputes; whereas the
latter, since the time of the Scaevolas, is largely the work of jurists, i.e., of
legal scientists and professors rather than merely of practical dispute
settlers.1 This does not mean that the common law does not have theorists
and theory or that the civil law and later Roman law did not have practicing lawyers and judges. What it does mean, however, is that in the common
law, because of the primary role of the lawyers and judges in its creation,
the cases tend to be at the focus of attention and to predominate over the
generated and generalized principles; whereas in the civil law the reverse
tends to be true. This difference shows in the fact that in the common
law there are always cases for which no satisfactory principles are at hand
and always printiples for deciding certain cases which do not lie down
comfortably with the principles used for deciding other cases. In the civil
law, on the other hand, the theory, as in certain portions of mathematical
1 LAWSON, A CoMMON LAWYER LOO!(S AT THE CIVIL LAw 69 (1953). References to
Professor Lawson's book are hereafter included in parentheses following the quotation
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physics, tends to outrun the cases or the facts, enabling one to construct
and predict certain possible facts and cases which have never been found
in fact.
The difference between the legal positivism of Austin and that of the
continentally-trained Kelsen comes to the reviewer's mind in this connection. For Kelsen, the fundamental thing in the legal system is the grundnorm. This fits in with the mathematical physicist's deductively formulated
conception of scientific method in which all the facts of a given subject
matter are brought under a single set of minimum basic assumptions.
British legal positivists, in the common law tradition, however, are very
critical and suspicious of a single grundnorm. This shows even in the
British trained Italian defender of natural law philosophy, Professor A. P.
d'Entreves of Oxford.2
The conception of scientific method of British legal positivists and of
lawyers in the common law tradition, apart from the late Underhill Moore,
is the more piecemeal, purely inductive natural history method of the
traditional biological and descriptive natural history sciences. These
sciences obtain principles, to be sure, and thus have theory, but the theories
tend to be as complex in their basic concepts and generalizations as are
the inductive data. Furthermore, the concepts and principles do not reduce
to a small number of elementary notions and primitive postulates. Hence
the British legal positivist's and the common lawyer's suspicion of a single
g;rundnorm.
Professor Lawson points out, however, that there are exceptions in the
common law world to this general conclusion. It is not, he adds, until we
put the small number of precise legal concepts of Hohfeld under the analytical jurisprudence of Williston on Contracts that we obtain the type of
legal thinking in Anglo-American common law that is comparable to the
legal mentality of the later Roman jurists and the modern civilians. This
type of legal thinking comes very late in the common law tradition.
This distinction between the different conceptions of scientific method
in the common law and the civil and Roman law traditions has considerable
historical and philosophical importance. It means that the conceptual generalization in the jus gentium of Roman law and the eventual triumph of
the concepts of the jus gentium over those of the jus civile in the Digest
of Justinian did not have its origin solely in the practical needs of the
Romans to carry on trade with non-Romans, as some legally positivistically
minded students of Roman law would like to suggest. It finds its basis
instead in a novel scientific way of thinking about these and all other
practical transactions and disputes.
For this and other reasons, Professor Lawson affirms that it is necessary
to put oneself inside the content of Roman law to understand either it or
the civil law. A mere viewing of Roman law from the outside, from the
2 See the comment on Professor Kelsen's grundnorm in his 1955 Notre Dame lecture!
to appear in the first issue of the NATURAL LAw FORUM.
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standpoint of British common law, legal positivism, German historismus,
Ihering's psychological theory of interests or any other modem mentality
will not do. Nor will dictionary renderings of words in the Latin text
suffice. Commenting upon the suggestion of Dean Roscoe Pound that the
"essential difference between the Civil Law and the Common Law is one
not of substance but of method," Professor Lawson says, "I think it is time
for English and American comparative lawyers to shed this preoccupation
and study more closely the chief components of the substantive Civil Law."
(p. 45) Nor does Professor Lawson believe that codification is the key to
the difference between the common law and the modem civil law or Roman
law, since "a code is not a necessary mark of a Civil Law system nor the
absence of one a mark of a Common Law system . . . ." (p. 46) What is
important, instead, with respect to codification as it bears on this question, is the "type of mind" of the civil law system which, while more
"favorable to codification," is also "more important .than codes." (p. 46)
Turning to the substantive content of the Roman law of contract of the
Institutes of Gaius and Justinian, he notes that contracts are of four types:
(1) real, (2) verbal, (3) literal, and (4) consensual, together with a miscellaneous "innominate" group.
A contract is real when one party hands over a thing to the other party.
A "verbal contract" was called by the Romans a "stipulation" and took
a question and answer form. It contained two elements: form and agreement. The form required that the same principal verb be used in the
question put by the questioner and in the answer given that sealed the
commitments of the agreement as expressed in the question. The stipulation or verbal contract had two important implications quite apart from
the verb constancy of its form. First, it placed the burden of specifying
the contract upon the questioner. Second, it required the agreement- of
the person who answered. This has the consequence in civil law societies
of making all donations devoid of legal validity unless there is a verbal
acceptance from the recipient of the donation by the donee. Because of
this requirement, Professor Lawson notes that in Quebec some lawyers
have rejected trusts for unborn persons on the ground that a trust to be
legal requires the acceptance by the actual person who receives it. The
key, however, to the mentality of Roman law and civil law shows in another
characteristic of the stipulation which Professor Lawson describes as follows:
"If we consider the content of the stipulation, we shall see at once
that it must have been infinitely variable. The stipulation was not a
contract but a contractual form, a mould for contracts." (p. 116)
Expressed in terms of mathematical logic, this means that the stipulation in Roman law entailed two technical concepts: (1) the concept of
the variable, designated in modem mathematical and logical notation by
the symbol "x" and meaning "any one" as opposed to the proper name
of a specific one, on the one hand, and to the class concept of all the similar
ones on the other hand. (2) The concept of the matrix, or propositional
form, in which the material common sense concepts, called by modern
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logicians "material constants" are replaced with variables. The scientific
importance of these two logical concepts is that they break scientific statements loose from specific material examples of the formal properties of the
statements. This is precisely what the stipulation did with respect to the
rigid codes with their specific law-of-status content of the pre-Stoic Roman
Twelve Tables. Anything whatever could be contracted regardless of its
common sense material content providing that the form by which the
content was specified possessed certain formal properties. The second
scientific importance of the notion of the variable is that it enables one to
achieve generality for more than one individual or instance while at the
same time preserving the fact that one is dealing with one particular individual and one particular instance. Thereby justice is done to the individuality of the case as well as to its generality. In short, the concept of
the variable brings both the concept of universal formal lawfulness and
the notion of equity into Roman legal science. This occurred in the stipulation.
The third type of Roman contract, the literal contract, need not concern
us since it disappeared very soon. The fourth type, the consensual contract,
is exceedingly important. It arose, Professor Lawson suggests, because the
stipulation, due to its infinite variability, was ideal for dealing with "odds
and ends," but lacked the standardization for the easy handling of transactions which constantly occurred. The consensual contracts met this deficiency of the stipulation. They covered four species-sale, hire, partnership and mandate. They were called "consensual" because "they were
quite informal and ... were binding from the moment of agreement ... :"
(pp. 116, 117)
The consensual contracts were distinguished from stipulation in one
other respect. As previously noted, the stipulation had to specify in the
question all that was legally valid and enforceable. The consensual agreements, on the other hand, even though informal, entailed legally what was
"naturally implied" as well as what was literally said. How, in the case
of the consensual contracts, is the naturally implied to be determined?
We are prepared for the Roman's answer to this question if we note a
logical property of the literal character of the stipulation. Professor Lawson expresses this logical attribute as follows, using the words of a judge,
"But you are asking us to interpret something which can have only the
specific shape which you give to it by your formal act." (p. 126) The
point here is that, in the stipulation, one is entering not into a standardized and familiar.transaction but into an agreement which is unusual and
exceptional, or what Professor Lawson has described as "odds and ends."
Hence, the judge can only interpret what one entered into if one specifies
what it was. This specification, the stipulation requires. In other words,
the law has, in the case of the stipulation, "the specific shape which you
give to it by your formal act." (p. 126)
But how, then, could Roman law make so much use of the consensual
contract with its "naturally implied," as well as explicitly stipulated, mean-

1034

MICHIGAN

LAw

REVIEW

[ Vol. 54

ings? Again the answer of the Roman jurists is a formal logical answer
rather than an intuitive, material and merely inductive one. "The consensual contracts," Professor Lawson writes, "were not so much contracts
as what have been called contractual figures . . . ." (p. 126) They were
standardized forms with formal relations and implications quite independent of any stipulated material content which may illustrate them, after
the manner of the four figures of the Aristotelian syllogism. These four
contractual figures were, let it be recalled, sale, hire, partnership and mandate. But they were these four standardized transactions in their formal
properties, not in their merely concrete, inductively given material content.
In short, the consensual form of Roman contract is formalized legal knowledge rather than merely the material content of that knowledge. Being
thus formalized, each of the four species of the Roman consensual type of
contract had its formal logical implications. The pursuit of these formal
logical implications specified the method to be used by the judge in determining what was "naturally implied" in the standard contractual figure in
question in any legal case.
Professor Lawson suggests also how the formal properties of the four
contractual figures which define the possible consensual contracts were
determined. These contractual figures were not merely four different, inductively observed classes of transactions frequently entered into by men
in an informal way, they were also internally related due to the fact that
they were the products of a deeper analysis of the subject matter of law.
Professor Lawson writes:
·
"The consensual contracts were not so much contracts as what
have been called contractual figures [which were] the products derived from an analysis of movement in the legal world . . . . It is as
if the Roman jurists of about 100 B.C. had said, Go where you will,
you will find that almost everything can be reduced to four processes:
(1) shifting goods permanently from one man's estate to another for
a money price; (2) placing one person's property or services temporarily at the disposal of another for a consideration usually in money;
(3) the pooling of property, skill, or experience by several persons for
a common purpose; and (4) the gratuitous performance of a task by
one person on the instructions of another." (p. 127)
One is reminded of the derivation of the four figures of the Aristotelian
syllogism as products from the four A, E, I and O propositional forms in
which any syllogistic argument on any material subject matter whatever
must be expressed. In this connection it is to be noted that the most important Roman jurist "of about 100 B.C." was Scaevola, the first systematic formulator of Roman law who died in 95 B.C. Scaevola and his
colleagues were primarily jurists rather than mere1y practicing lawyers and
judges. They were also dominated in their thinking by Stoic philosophy.3
The latter philosophy was permeated with the logical categories and formalism of Aristotle. These Stoic philosophers and legal thinkers also
3.ARNoLD, ROMAN STOICISM 383 ff. (1911); also chapter 12.
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affirmed that their theory of ethics and law derived from their logic and
from their physics.4 Their physics was Greek. Greek physics was dominated
by mathematics. In short, it exemplified the logically and mathematically
formalized, the universally quantified use of variables, and the deductive
formulation in terms of a minimum set of basic assumptions.
Although Professor Lawson does not go outside his description of the
formal, logical and analytic character of the substantive content of the
Roman law into Roman Stoic philosophy and Greek mathematical physics,
it is not irrelevant to note that ethical and legal thinkers like the Scaevolas
and their Roman and Byzantine successors, who referred to Greek physics
as the source of their theory of ethics and law, 5 must have been aware of
the greatest achievement of Greek mathematical physics. This achievement
was the solution of the problem produced by the discovery of arithmetically
incommensurable geometrical magnitudes. The solution was achieved in
Eudoxus' definition of the equality of ratios for any magnitudes whatever,
which has come down to us in Definition V of Book V of Euclid's Elements.
The importance of this definition is that for the first time in the history
of science the notion of the universally quantified variable (x) is used to
define a technical scientific concept.. This is precisely what occurs with the
Greek and Stoic Roman philosophers and lawyers when they use the universally quantified variable (p), where p is a person, to define the ethically
and legally good, thereby arriving at the notion that moral and legal man
is not the old family and tribal man of the law of status of the Twelve
Tables, but is instead any tribe, and, even more, any man whatever. It is
this use of the universally quantified free variable to define the words
"good" and "just" which gives the aforementioned formula:
(p) : x is good or just

=

(p) x.

Furthermore it is this formula which enables the Roman Empire, when
the tribe of Rome conquers the tribes of other city-states, to put the jus civile
of any other tribe and state on the same footing of equality under Roman
law as is enjoyed by the jus civile of the local law of Rome. Furthermore,
it is the universal quantification of the individual as well as the tribe which
eventually in the jus gentium begins to break down the patria potestas
of any law of status-jus civile whatever to inaugurate the lengthy effort,
which the recent Supreme Court decision in the United States on segregation in education is attempting to complete, in which not merely all families, but also any individual regardless of his family or tribe of birth has
an equal right before the law to any public education or any other public thing if that thing is to be publicly good, or just.
Need one wonder, therefore, that Professor Lawson concludes his chapter
on "The Form and Sources of the Civil Law" as follows:

4 Id., chapter 6.
IS Id., chapters 6 and 7. See
DEORUM ACADEMICA Vii (1933).

also H. Rackham's Introduction to

CICERO DE NATURA
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"I must end this chapter by describing the way in which the Roman
instinct for sharpness of outline, intensified in its operation by the
natural lawyers, marked off the Civil Law itself from all other parts
of their law ..•. The Civil Law was essentially a law between equals.
That is why the patria potestas, the absolute power of the father over
all his descendants in the male line, interested the jurists only incidentally, as something by getting out of which one became the equal
of other citizens and as affording the paterfamilias useful ways of
doing business through others, often with limited liability." (pp.
88, 89)
Similarly, in the chapter on "The Contribution of Roman Law," Professor Lawson speaks of its "universal tendency." The jus civile of the citizens of Rome became restricted largely to family law and the law of succession with respect to family property. As the Empire expanded, such laws,
Professor Lawson notes, "were no concern of the Roman state or its courts;
but the greater part of the law of contract was universal, and so were in
substance the whole of the law of tort and of property." (p. 95) By the
time of the Edict of Caracalla in 212 A.D.,
" ... almost all the free inhabitants of the Empire were Roman citizens,
and by a parallel process the more formal and less rational elements
of Roman Law disappeared, leaving the universal elements, which
were also the more rational, to stand alone. There is little or
nothing that is purely national in the Rpman Law contained in Justinian's Corpus Juris." (p. 96)
Clearly, Professor Lawson has established his general conclusion that
civil and Roman law are to be distinguished from the common law due to
a difference in their form and that this difference in form has its source in
a difference in the legal mentalities that created the two systems. When
we place his findings concerning the formal properties of the substantive
Roman law of contract in the historical contexts of its creators, vis-a-vis
Stoic Roman philosophy, Aristotelian logic and Greek mathematical physics,
we are able to describe the mentality of Roman and civilian lawyers with
more precision. It is the mentality of men who have taken deductively
formalized Greek mathematical physics as their criterion of scientific method
and its concept of the universally quantified variable as their definition of
the morally good and the legally just.
Our more precise specification of the legal mentality behind the civil
law, so far as it derives from the Roman law of the jurists, requires a
qualification to be placed upon one conclusion of Professor Lawson. He
questions the well-known thesis that the difference between the civil law
and the common law is that between deduction and induction, pointing
to the fact that the common lawyer has generalizations going beyond the
inductive cases, from which he reasons deductively, just as does the civilian.
This, of course, is true: Nevertheless, there is a more important sense in
which the civilian is deductive in a technical scientific sense in which the
traditional common lawyer is not. The common lawyer, as previously
noted, has principles to which he appeals, as well as his cases. But his
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principles are more piecemeal inductions from a natural history type of
scientist's description of his particular facts and cases. He does not have
theory in the sense of the logically and mathematically formalized, deductively formulated theory of mathematical physics. Nor does he take this
type of scientific theory and method as his model for legal science. It is
in this latter sense of the word "deduction" that the mentality of the civil
lawyer is deductive and that of the common lawyer is not.
After his emphasis upon the universalizing tendency of Roman law,
Professor Lawson stresses that it has another "remarkable characteristic;"
it is a "law of movement." By this he means that Roman law is not "concerned to describe what is;" instead it asks the question concerning liow
"a particular legal situation come[s] into existence and how [it will] disappear." (p. 96) An example occurs in the law of property where "the
Roman bias is for studying the acquisition rather than the transfer of
property. The Romans never discuss the nature of ownership or possession." (p. 99) Expressed more formally, this means that Roman law finds
the key to law in verbs rather than in nouns. Recall how the stipulation
requires the questioner and answerer to use the same form of the verb.
It means also that the formal properties of the law refer to relations or
operations, after the manner of the function of mathematics, rather than
to things. Things are thrown, as in mathematics, into the realm of the
material constants. It is the formal properties of the relations or functional operations with respect to the quantified variables that matter.
Is it not precisely at this point that Roman law and the civil law, following it, receive their theoretical unity? Relations or functional operations, considered in their formal properties, have a range of application
far wider than that of inductively given and classified things. Thus, by
concentrating attention on the form.al properties of functional relations,
Roman legal science appears to have found, or to have come near to finding, the primitive concepts of its axiomatically or contractually constructed
deductive theory. This way of thinking had two consequences. One
appeared immediately. In any axiomatically constructed theory, the primitive operations or relations are, by definition, ultimate; they are never
regarded as abstractions from a wider context. In natural history deductive science, on the other hand, because of its use of sensed material qualities in the definitions of its objects and classes, any relation is always an
abstraction from a wider context. This difference shows in Roman law.
Professor Lawson describes it as the "isolation of the relation between the
parties from its surrounding circumstances and problems . . . ." (p. 123)
He describes this as "artificial." It is only artificial for the natural history
descriptive, more purely inductive, type of science. For axiomatically constructed theory, and particularly for the primitive operations of such
theory, it is the only non-artificial scientific procedure.
The second consequence of basing law upon the operations rather than
the objects in legal transactions was to set the specification of a few elementary ideas, from which everything else is derived deductively, as the
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ultimate goal of legal science. Professor Lawson makes it clear that Roman
law realized this ideal only in part, not having a "general law of contract"
and that this process of generalization went on with the modern civilian,
reaching its most perfect expression in the German civil code of the late
nineteenth century.
The application of the Roman legal ideal and way of thinking to the
modern national states brought with it certain conflicts and complexities.
There were the local living laws of the different peoples to be reckoned
with. Even in France today, the living law of its southern portion differs
from that of the north. The old law of status-familial ways still carry on.
In' fact, as Professor Lawson notes, the French democratic reformers used
the French Revolution to wipe out the political control of the aristocracy
and to preserve in considerable part the law of status of the peasants. Consequently the move toward a single, unified, analytically axiomatized and
deductive theory of law did not go as far in France as it did in Germany.
These considerations, put into perspective by Professor Lawson's lectures,
show that the contemporary legal institutions of the Western world become intelligible only if one pays attention to the Roman factor in positive
civil law as well as to the positive common law and relates the positive law
in each case to the local living law of sociological jurisprudence.
In this connection, it is of interest to note that the predominant religious
living law of most common law nations today is Protestant; whereas that of
most civil law communities is Roman Catholic. With the fall of the Roman
Empire the mentality of Greek mathematical physics and philosophy and
of Stoic Roman law passed into Roman Catholic and Greek Orthodox
Christianity. One of the consequences of the Protestant Reformation was
that, in throwing off Rome in religion, it tended also to throw away the
ethical, legal and scientific mentality of ancient Greece and Stoic Rome in
law and politics. Also Rome, even in the days of its Empire, never dominated Britain to the extent, or for the length of time, that it commanded
the people of the Western portion of the Continent. It is likely also that
it was the strength of the diverse living laws of Angles, Saxons, Jutes and
Celts in Britain which enabled Roman legal terminology and the Roman
substitution of the law of contract for the law of status to pass into English
law in the Roman period without its Greek scientific and Stoic Roman
formalism going there also.
Also, with the modern scientific and philosophical revolution, led by
Galileo, Descartes, Newton and Locke, modern British philosophy, following Locke, took the form of British empiricism with its final insistence
upon the nominalistic and more purely inductive source of all conceptual
meaning; whereas the modern philosophy of the Continental peoples, originating in Descartes, was the creation of the mathematical physicists, Descartes, Leibnitz and Kant, and took" the form of Continental rationalism
with its emphasis on the a priori and the deductively formal rather than
upon the merely nominalistic and more purely inductive factor in scientific method and knowledge. Thus the religious living law, the success of
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the Counter Reformation and their particular modern philosophy reinforce the Roman legal mentality in the Civil law peoples; whereas the lesser
influence of the Roman Empire, the success of the Protestant Reformation
and the excessively nominalistic and more inductively empirical form of
modern British philosophy probably accounts for the difference between
the common law in England and the civil law elsewhere notwithstanding
the shift from status to contract and the technical Latin legal terminology
which is common to both systems.
In the case of England there is one important thinker, noted by Professor Lawson, whose mentality is an exception. His name is Newton. To
read his Principia is to be confronted with something like Euclid's Elements.
His is the concept of scientific method of the Greek mathematical physicists
and philosophers and the Stoic Roman and civilian lawyers. The mentality
of the early Locke, who ·was a friend of Newton and who lectured on
natural law at Oxford and wrote the aforementioned Letter on Toleration
and treatise Of Civil Government, was undoubtedly similar. It was to the
mentality of Newton and this early Locke and a Bacon undoubtedly conceived in harmony with them, to whom Jefferson referred when he said
that his three gods were Bacon, Newton and Locke. 6 Hence it is this
mentality of the mathematical physicist's concept of scientific method and
of universally quantified natural law, going through Jefferson into the
Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights, only to be submerged
with the triumph of the nominalism of the later Locke's Essay Concerning
Human Understanding and its attendant psychological theory of ethics of
Hume and positivistic theory of law of Austin, that reappears again in the
recent Supreme Court decision on segregation in education to give the
comparative study of the common law, civil law and Roman law its
peculiar significance for everyone in the United States today.

F. S. C. Northrop,
Yale University Law School•

.

6 7 JEFFERSON, THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON (H. A. Washington ed.) 139 (1854).
• The author is indebted to the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research, Inc. for a grant which makes this and other research possible.

